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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PROPERTY IMPROVEMENT
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs

«

CLEON D. TUCKER and MRS.
CLEON D. TUCKER, also
known as BETTY J. TUCKER,
his wife; WILLARD M. TUCKER
and MRS. WILLARD M. TUCKER,
also known as PHYLLIS 0.
TUCKER, his wife; CONTINENTAL ACCOUNT SERVICING
HOUSE, INC., a Utah corporation; and KEY ACCOUNT
COLLECTION HOUSE, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

No. 14231

Defendants,
EUGENE S. SIMPSON and MRS.
EUGENE S. SIMPSON, also known
as JANE DOE SIMPSON, his
)
wife,
. ,

)

Defendants and
Appellants.
)
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action on a promissory note bearing the
names of the Defendants-Appellants and others.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff filed its complaint based upon a promissory note bearing the names of the Defendants-Appellants and
others.

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to all

defendants was granted as to the individual defendants but
denied as to the corporate defendants whose cases are still
before the trial court. Defendants-Appellants have appealed
the lower court's order of summary judgment against them.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants-Appellants Simpson (hereinafter referred
to as "Defendants Simpson") and others executed a promissory
note to Plaintiff-Respondent (hereinafter referred to as
"Plaintiff"), on March 26, 1974, in the amount of $150,000.00,
the proceeds therefrom being received by the Defendants Simpson
for their own benefit.

The promissory note was executed for the

purpose of facilitating a sale of certain stock and other interests
in Continental Account Servicing House, Inc., and Key Account
Collection House, Inc., both party defendants in this action but
not participating in this appeal. The seller in this transaction
was Eugene S. Simpson and the buyers were Mr. and Mrs. Cleon D.
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Tucker and Mr. and Mrs. Willard M. Tucker, all named defendants.
As partial security for the promissory note, the
Defendants Tucker were required to and did place into Continental Account Servicing House, Inc., certain real properties
valued in excess of $1,000,000.00. As additional security,
the Defendants Simpson were required to and did place into
escrow certain stock of the Defendant corporations. However,
on or about June 17, 1974, the Defendants Tucker removed the
real properties from the said corporation, allegedly because
they believed themselves to have been defrauded by the Defendants Simpson.
As a result of the transfer of that real property
out of the corporation, the terms of both the promissory note
and the contract of sale were breached, and Plaintiff's security
on the note was seriously jeopardized.

Plaintiff brought this

action for judgment on the promissory note and for a decree
that the stock held in escrow might be sold at public auction.
After the pleadings were filed by all parties, Plaintiff
moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as against the individual defendants, but, inasmuch
as the court felt the corporate defendants had* pled certain
defenses which established issues of material fact, judgment
was denied as against the corporate defendants.

Defendants

Simpson have appealed the trial court's decision.
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ARGUMENT
•

POINT I

THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WERE NO DISPUTED
'ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF
AND DEFENDANTS SIMPSON.
Defendants Simpson have claimed in their appeal
brief that certain issues of material fact remain unresolved
and that the matter should, therefore, be remanded to the
trial court*

Further, Defendants Simpson have listed in their

brief those question" which they allege to be disputed issues
of material fact, to-wit:
1. Defendants Simpson now allege that the signature
of Pauline Simpson was a forgery.
"Defendant Pauline Simpson. . .filed an
affidavit. . .that she did not execute
the promissory note in question and
that her purported signature was a
forgery." Appellants' Brief, 2.
2.

Defendants Simpson have sought refuge in the

defense of the corporate defendants that the contract was
unconscionable as to them.

"Other defendants averred. . .

that the terms of the agreement. . .were unconscionable. . . . "
Appellants' Brief, 2.
3.

Defendants Simpson have alleged that they are not

liable on the promissory note because they are mere accommodation
makers.

Appellants' Brief, 3.
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4.

Defendant Eugene S. Simpson has alleged that

after he executed the promissory note "the terms and conditions of the promissory note had been changed."

Appellants'

Brief, 3.
Each of these four issues raised by Defendants
Simpson in their brief will be dealt with separately, in
the order in which they were presented.
1.

There is no disputed issue of material
fact as to the signature of the Defendant
Mrs. Eugene S. Simpson.
Under the statutory law of the State of Utah, there

can be no disputed issue of material fact as to the signature
of Mrs. Eugene S. Simpson.

The Defendants Simpson failed to

deny specifically in their amended answer that the signature
was genuine, and the signature of Mrs. Eugene S. Simpson was,
therefore, admitted for all purposes. The law is stated at
§70A-3-307, U.C.A., 1953, "1. Unless specifically denied
in the pleadings, each signature on an instrument is admitted."
Official Comment 1 to that section of the Code explains its
significance.
"The purpose of the requirement of a
specific denial in the pleadings is to
give the plaintiff notice that he must
meet a claim of forgery or lack of authority as to a particular signature, and
to afford him an opportunity to investigate and obtain evidence. . . . In the
absence of such specific denial, the
signature stands admitted, and is not
in issue." (Emphasis added.)
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This section of the Uniform Commercial Code deals
specifically with commercial paper, and the promissory note
in question is by definition "commercial paper".

In the

present case, the answer of Defendants Simpson to Plaintiff's
amended complaint, filed by them on June 5, 1975, contains
absolutely nothing by way of a specific denial of Mrs. Simpson's signature.

On the contrary, 51 of their amended answer

is just a general denial to the allegations of Plaintiff's
amended complaint.

Under the rule of law applicable in Utah,

the signature of Mrs. Simpson stands admitted and is not in
issue.

Therefore, when the court granted summary judgment

to the Plaintiff, there was no disputed issue of fact concerning the signature since the signature stood admitted.
This rule has been applied not only in Utah but
in all other jurisdictions adopting the Uniform Commercial
Code, and there is uniform case authority from those jurisdictions supporting Plaintiff's position.
In Conran v. Yager, 211 S.E.2d 288, 16 U.C.C. 320
(S.C., 1975), the defendant appealed from a summary judgment
granted to the plaintiff.

The court based its decision affirm-

ing the summary judgment on §3-307 of the Commercial Code.
"The appellant's first defense, a general
denial, while effective in an action on
a simple contract is unavailing in an
action on a note where the note is attached
to the complaint," Id. 321.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 7-

See also Merrimack Farmers Exchange v. Elliott, 276 A.2d 258,
9 U.C.C, 287 (N.H., 1971).
In the present case, Defendants Simpson's sole
defense in their amended answer was a general denial and
this was an action on a promissory note where the note was
attached to the complaint.

In Bentz v. Mullins, 24 O.App.2d

137, 265 N.E.2d 317, 8 U.C.C. 726 (1970), the court stated,
"It will be observed that in pleading,
the answer of the defendant does not
specifically deny his signature is on
the note in question. . . . In the
absence of such specific denial, the
signature stands admitted and is not
in issue." Id. 728.
Also, in Ferris v. Nichols, 245 S.2d 660, 8 U.C.C. 1284 (Fla.,
1971), the court held,
"In our opinion, the answer of the defendant was simply a general denial of the
assertions of the complaint. As such
it had the legal effect of admitting
that the defendant did sign the note
and eliminating from the action any
issue as to signature. Had the defendant desired to deny that he signed the
note, he should have done so by a specific
denial addressed to the appropriate allegations in the complaint." Id. 1284-5.
(Emphasis added.)
See also Steelman v. Associates Discount Corporation, 7 U.C.C.
697 (Ga*App., 1970).
Any issue as to the alleged forgery of Mrs. Simpson's
signature was effectively waived and the signature was admitted
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when the Defendants Simpson filed their amended answer which
failed to deny the signature specifically.
2.

There is no disputed issue of material
fact as to the alleged unconscionability
of the agreement as to the Defendants
Simpson.
The Defendants Simpson do not allege that the con-

tract entered into is unconscionable as against themselves, but
rather, wish to bring themselves under the umbrella of a defense
that can only be alleged by other defendants to the action.
The Defendants Simpson are alleging, simply stated, that since
the contract is unconscionable as against the other defendants,
then they too should be relieved of any contractual obligations.
The Defendants Simpson refer to p. 90 of the record which is
the affidavit of Eugene S. Simpson.

That affidavit states

the alleged factual issue in question:

Since the execution

of the note, the Plaintiff had allegedly unconscionably ciltered
the contract by "the retention of a substantial proceeds of the
loan to the remaining defendants by agents of the Plaintiff."
R.91 (Emphasis added.)
There are two aspects of this purported defense
which bear close examination.

First, the "remaining defendants"

spoken by Mr. Simpson are the only parties to this action
allegedly affected by any unconscionable contract terms, and
the Defendants Simpson cannot avail themselves of a defense
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possibly available only to other parties, but not to themselves.

Secondly, the "remaining defendants" referred to in

the affidavit include Continental Account Servicing House,
Inc., and Key Account Collection House, Inc.

These corpor-

ations are not even parties to this appeal. The trial court
expressly recognized that factual issues might still exist
in relation to these two corporations and expressly denied
summary judgment as to them.

R.96-7. These corporate defen-

dants are not parties to this appeal and Defendants Simpson
cannot avail themselves of defenses available only to the
corporate defendants*
In addition to assailing principles of logic, the
appeal claim of Defendants Simpson assails principles of law.
How can the Defendants Simpson hope to avail themselves of
equitable defenses that can be available only to third parties
(the other defendants) when the corporate defendants are not
even parties to the appeal and their cases are presently continuing in the trial court.
to law.

Indeed they cannot according

This principle of law is stated concisely at 17A C.J.S.,

Contracts, §528 (1963).
"As a general rule, a defense, in order to
be available, must be one which may be
asserted by the party urging it in his
own right. . . . Equities existing in
favor of third persons against plaintiff
cannot be availed of by defendant where
he has received all the benefits to which
he is entitled under the contract."
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In the present case, the Defendants Simpson admit
that any "unconscionability" affected only the "remaining
defendants" and that the rights and interests of the Simpsons
were not affected thereby.

Such being the case, the defense

of unconscionability is not available to the Defendants Simpson.
Since the defense was not available to them, it certainly was
not a disputed issue of material fact and certainly could not
have prevented the court's order of summary judgment as against
the Defendants Simpson.
3-#. There is no disputed issue of material fact
as to the obligation of the Defendants Simpson on the promissory note as accommodation
makers.
The Defendants Simpson have alleged as a disputed
issue of material fact that they were mere accommodation
makers on the promissory note and are, therefore, not liable
as a matter of law on that note.

Utah statutory law concerning

promissory notes and accommodation makers is clear in stating
that an accommodation maker is every bit as liable on a
promissory note as is a party who signs the note for consideration.

The general principle is that an accommodation maker

has received some sort of consideration, albeit indirect or
intangible, or else he would not have signed the note.
this case Simpson received the money.

In

To hold otherwise would

severely disrupt the American banking system and would ignore
volumes of legal precedence both in Utah and elsewhere. Utah
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law on the matter has been codifi ed by the adoption,
§3-41 5 of tl le IJni form Commercial Code ; foi n: id <: it § 7<
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•

".

'•

..'•

•

•

•;' ' "(1) An accommodation par ty is one who
signs the instrument in any capacity for
the
purpose of lending his name to another
,:
party to it. (2) When the instrument has
-.''•.
been taken for value before it is due the
accommodation party is liable in the
capacity in which he has signed even
though the taker kn^ws of th^ accommodat •
Official Comme n I: Il t :: • tl :i :i

. ;

•1

-

it i on

maker or acceptor is bound on the instrument without any :i : esort
to h i s principal

:

I t: ; 1 las been held in the S tate of Utah tl lat even i f
the creditor knows that one of the other parties is an accommodati on maker. tl le accommodat i oi I maker ill s s til I Il ] it at 1 € DJI
the promissory note.

In Assets Realization Company v. Cardon,

, ~ _;.. ^9 7, 272 P 204 (1 9 2 8 ) , the court stated; •'

•

"There is mucl i mui-n. *. i p iaj-iitif f , s claim
that it is entitled to a judgment against
the defendant Cardon Company upon the
record before u s . Concededly, plaintiff
is the owner and holder of the two notes,
and, they have not 'been paid,. Defendant
, .. ••',
Cardon Company is admittedly one of the
makers of both the notes. Two defenses
were interposed by the defendant Cardon
Company to defeat plaintiff's action:
First, that it was an accommodation
maker
The mere fact that
McCormick and Company, Bankers, knew
that defendant Cardon Company was an
accommodation maker does not defeat
plaintiff's right to recover," Id, 206.
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The case of Miller v. Stuart, 69 Ut. 250, 253 P. 900
(192 7) states clearly that an accommodation maker is liable
on the instrument.
"The evidence plainly shows that defendant
executed and delivered the note for the
purpose of lending his credit to the coal
company or Quigley and Welch, relying upon
their promise to pay the note. Defendant,
in his answer, averred that it was represented to him, among other things, that
the note 'was merely an accommodation and
convenience to said Pahvant Coal Company.1
That is the essence of the matter, and
the defendant testified, in effect, that
he so understood it. In such case, the
relation of defendant to the note was that
of accommodation party, who is defined and
whose liability is fixed by the negotiable
instruments law as follows: 'An accommodation party is one who has signed the
instrument as maker. . .without receiving
value therefor, and for the purpose of
lending his name to some other person.
Such a person is liable on the instrument
to a holder for value. . . . • " Id. 902
[Citations following.] (Emphasis added.)
The negotiable instruments law which was adopted
in Utah has been superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code,
and the effect of the Commercial Code is even more conclusive
than was the negotiable instruments law.

The difference is

explained at 11 Am.Jur.2d, Bills and Notes, §530 (1963).
". . .The [Uniform Commercial] Code
eliminates troublesome questions as to
consideration and directs itself to the
fact that an accommodation party is
always a surety whether or not he is
compensated or receives consideration*11
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"2. Defendants. . .allege affirmatively
that the terms of the note which is
attached as Exhibit "A" to Plaintiff's
amended complaint speaks for itself. . . .
"5. Defendants. . .allege affirmatively
that the terms of the contract in the
escrow agreement speak for themselves."
(R.76)
Even if one of the parties to this appeal had hoped
to rely on changed or altered terms in the promissory note or
the contract for sale, such reliance could not be allowed.
The Utah Statute of Frauds specifically provides that a contract
for the sale of securities must be in writing, and this would
include any modifications of such contract.

§70A-8-319 U.C.A.

The Utah statutes further provide that any contract for the
sale of contract rights or an interest in a corporation must
also be in writing and this, too, would include any modifications of such contract.

§§70A-l-206, 70A-2-201, U.C.A.'

The Utah Legislature has also adopted a parol evidence rule, found at §70A-2-202, U.C.A., which would conclusively prohibit the court from considering any purported oral
modifications or changes in the promissory note or the contract
for sale.
"Terms with respect to which the confirmatory
memoranda of the parties agree or which are
otherwise set forth in a writing intended by
the parties as a final expression of their
agreement with respect to such terms as are
included therein may not be contradicted by
evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement, but may be
explained or supplemented. . .(b) by evidence
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terms, not reduced to writing, may be proved,
unless the court finds that the writing was
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matters to be considered by a jury or by the trier of fact
and the court's order of summary judgment was proper and
correct*
POINT II
THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW HEREIN
APPLICABLE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND THE
DEFENDANTS SIMPSON IS SIGNIFICANTLY
RESTRICTED DUE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THE CASE.
It is the rule in appellate proceedings that the
proceedings before the trial court are presumed to have been
proper and any rulings are presumed to have been properly
made and for sound reasons.
"The scope of appellate review is largely
influenced by a number of rebuttable presumptions, pre-eminent among which is that
which, at least where the decision has
been rendered by a court of record or
a court of general jurisdiction, assumes
the correctness of the decision or ruling
appealed from and the regularity of the
proceedings below. Thus, every reasonable
intendment favorable to a ruling of the
court below will be indulged, and in the
absence of an affirmative showing to the
contrary, a ruling of the court below will
be presumed to have been properly made
and for sound reasons." 5 Am.Jur.2d,
Appeal and Error, §704 (1962).
^ '~\ . :
It is Plaintiff's contention that Defendants Simpson
have failed to make any affirmative showing that any of the
rulings of the trial court directed against them were improper
or unsound.

Defendants Simpson have presented to the court

on appeal four purported factual issues.

In each case, it
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failure to plead it specifically in their amended answer;
any alleged unconscionability of the agreement as to other
defendants cannot be a defense for the Defendants Simpson;
an accommodation maker is clearly liable under law to the
same extent as any other maker on a promissory note; and
the written, integrated terms of the promissory note and
contract for sale must stand alone, both under law and as
admitted in the amended answer of the Defendants Simpson.
Respectfully submitted,
Kay M. Lewis
JENSEN & LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
320 South 300 East, Suite 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the
foregoing Respondent's Brief to Richard J. Leedy, Attorney
for Appellant, 744 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Ut
Utah 84102,
this s ^
day of November, 1975, postage prepaid.
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